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SUMMARY
In the future, nuclear assemblies containing fission products will
be transported at high speeds. An example is]a.reactor supplying power
to a large subsonic airplane,'••- In 'this case an accident can occur result-
ing in a ground impact at speeds up to 1000 fps.
One method for containing fission products is to put the radioactive
material in a containment vessel and design the vessel and its contents
to absorb the impact energy without rupturing the vessel. After impact
the heat from the decay of fission products must be transferred through
the containment vessel wall and radiated, and convected to the surround-
ing environment even when the containment system is partially buried.
This paper analyzes the containment vessel temperatures after impact
and attempts to understand the design variables that affect the post
impact survival of the system. The heat transfer analysis includes con-
duction, radiation, and convection in addition to the core material heats
of fusion and vaporization under partially burial conditions. Also, in-
cluded is the fact that fission products vaporize and transport radially
outward and condense on cooler surfaces, resulting in a moving heat
source. A computer program entitled "Executive Subroutines for Afterheat
Temperature Analysis" (ESATA) was written to consider this complex heat
transfer analysis.
Seven cases were calculated of a reactor power system capable of de-
livering up to 300 MW of thermal power to a nuclear airplane. The results
are
(1) The time required to reach the peak containment vessel tempera-
ture following the impact event could be in excess of 445 hours.
(2) The maximum peak containment vessel temperature calculated was
1660° F on the buried portion for the 300 MW, 50% burial, 60% fission
product redistribution case.
(3) Lowering the reactor power level from 300 to 100 MW results in a
400° F decrease in the temperature of the buried portion of the contain-
ment vessel.
INTRODUCTION
The safety of large stationary and shipboard nuclear powerplants has
been a primary design consideration for many years. In the future small
nuclear powerplants may be used as a power source for mobile applications.
Examples are reactors supplying power to aircraft and ground transporta-
tion vehicles.
In most of these cases an accident can occur which will result in a
ground impact at speeds in excess of 1000 fps. If the impact is against
a hard surface such as concrete or granite the reactor will undergo very
high deceleration forces. The result will.be structural failure of the
coolant system and fracture of the cladding on the fuel elements (refs. 2,
3, and 4). Even under these accident conditions the fission products
must be contained, i.e., not allowed to be released into the surrounding
environment.
One method for containing fission products under these severe acci-
dent conditions is to put the nuclear reactor in a containment vessel and
design the vessel and its contents to absorb the impact energy without
rupturing the vessel. Gross deformation will occur in the case of impact-
ing a hard surface. In the case of impacting soft ground the deformation
will be less but partial or complete burial of the containment vessel may
occur.
After impact the heat from the decay of the fission products must be
dissipated. With the loss of the coolant system the heat must be trans-
ferred through the containment wall and dissipated via natural convection
and radiation from the surface of the impacted containment vessel.
This paper analyzes the containment vessel temperatures after impact.
The heat transfer analysis within the containment vessel includes conduc-
tion, radiation, and convection in addition to the core material heats of
fusion and vaporization. Also included is the fission products vaporiz-
ing, transporting radially outward and condensing on cooler surfaces re-
sulting in a moving heat source. The analysis treats the containment
vessel system as lumped components, i.e., it does not mock-up valves,
ducts, and containment system penetrations, etc.
The remainder of this report examines the impact event and describes
the containment vessel system after impact under partial burial condi-
tions. A parametric heat transfer analysis is conducted on the post
impact configuration to determine the amount of heat that can be dissi-
pated without melting or rupturing the containment vessel. The configu-
ration analyzed is that of a containment vessel of varying degrees of
ground burial in the undeformed state. The undeformed state was chosen
as a limiting case that better represented the configuration of a soft
impact.
Previous Impact Studies
The impact velocity of the reactor containment system is strongly.
dependent on its application. In the case of the nuclear airplane,
present designs are for large subsonic aircraft (ref. 1). Therefore,
top impact velocities would be at 1000 to 1100 fps (ref. 2). Reactors
supplying power for space stations could re-enter the atmosphere and im-
pact at even higher speeds depending on their ballistic drag coefficients.
In all of these applications it is assumed that the primary decelerator,
such as parachutes, has failed to function.
Impact can occur on hard surfaces such as granite, concrete or rock
or it may occur on softer surfaces such as water and soft earth. The
hard surface impact will cause maximum deformation of the containment
system. The soft surface impact may cause less deformation but may re-
sult in full or partial burial.
Hard Surface
Impact tests have been conducted at Sandia Corporation and Holloman
AFB, New Mexico on two-foot-diameter reactor containment vessel systems
weighing up to 1300 pounds (refs. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). These designs rep-
resented a reactor surrounded by radiation shielding and a containment
vessel, both of which were designed to absorb.impact energy.
The models were accelerated on a sled to speeds of 1055 fps and im-
pacted against a reinforced concrete block weighing 18 000 pounds. Fig-
ure 1 shows a model in the before and after impact condition. The defor-
mation of this model 6/R was measured as 0.92 (where 6 is defined as
the diameter of the vessel before impact minus the height of the vessel
after impact and R is the vessel radius before impact).
The concrete block suffered considerable damage. Figure 2 shows a
before and after photograph of the block. The model impacted the block
and rested on the desert floor as shown in figure 2(b). For heat dissi-
pation, this type of impact appears to be the most desirable since the
containment vessel does not bury itself but remains exposed for radiation
and convection of the heat from its surface.
Soft Surface
Impacting a soft target.such as soil results in less deformation of
the model. Depending on the soil properties, angle of impact and the
W/A of the model (model weight to frontal area ratio) the model may be
lying on the surface of the soil, partially buried, or fully buried. In
reference 7 C. W. Young has developed an empirical equation for the pre-
diction of the amount of penetration that an impacted projectile would
experience.
The soft surface model of impact then becomes the more severe case
for the dissipation of afterheat from the containment vessel surface.
In this case not only must the heat of convection and radiation be con-
sidered but also the amount of heat conducted into the adjacent soil.
ANALYSIS
After impact the model has sustained sufficient impact forces to de-
stroy the coolant system. The fission products when decaying, start with
high heat generation and then decay to much lower values (fig. 3). Dur-
ing the early hours after impact the heat generated far exceeds the
amount dissipated from the containment vessel surface. Core temperatures
increase until melting and vaporization can occur. The vapor transport
can aid in the dissipation of the heat by moving the heat sources away
from the hot spots outward, closer to the containment vessel. The molten
material tends to block the downward movement of vaporized heat sources,
causing the heat sources to move upward, away from the part of the vessel
insulated by the ground and toward the part of the vessel most easily
cooled by radiation and convection to the air.
The resultant time-temperature history depends on the design of the
system. If the system has large amounts of heat absorbing material, the
heat is soaked up during the initial decay period thus offsetting those
high heating rates. Consequently, internal temperatures are lower. If
there is little heat absorbing material the internal temperatures will
increase rapidly causing rapid core melting, fission product vaporization
and heat source movement.
Description of the Containment Vessel System
The reactor containment.vessel system that was used as a reference
design for study in this report is shown in figure 4. It is a system de-
signed to deliver up to 300 megawatts of thermal power to a nuclear air-
plane. The system consists of a thermal reactor which is surrounded by
gamma and neutron shielding. The shielded reactor is surrounded by a con-
tainment vessel for protection in the event of an impact. Adjacent to
the surface of the containment vessel is a layer of insulation to protect
the vessel from direct deposit of the fission heat sources. The insula-
tion tends to reduce containment vessel hot spots and to increase the
amount of heat stored within the vessel by increasing the average temper-
ature of the contents in the containment vessel for any given surface tem-
perature.
During normal operation the reactor core consists of fuel pins that
are cooled by high pressure helium which is contained by pressure tubes.
Water is provided as the moderator. A typical unit designed to provide
300 megawatts thermal heat to helium at 1730° F can be enclosed inside
a spherical reactor containment vessel of 20 feet outside diameter. Per-
tinent reactor characteristics are shown in table 1. Principal materials
of construction are shown in table 2,
Description of the ESATA Program
A computer program entitled "Executive Subroutines for Afterheat Tem-
perature Analysis" (ESATA)°» was used to analyze the time-temperature
history of the reference design described above. The ESATA program uses
an existing TAP-A computer program developed by Westinghouse. TAP-A
solves problems involving transient and steady-state heat transfer in
multi-dimensional systems having arbitrary geometric configurations,
boundary conditions, initial conditions, and physical properties. It also
has the capability of considering the following models of heat transfer
and boundary conditions: internal conduction, free and forced convection,
radiation of external surfaces, specified time-dependent surface tempera-
tures, and specified time-dependent surface heat fluxes.
The computer code ESATA was formed by adding subroutines to the TAP-A
code to account for the following phenomena included in this analysis:
(1) Heat source redistribution due to vapor transport of fission
product from the core. The fission products transport radially outward
and condense on cooler surfaces. This results in a heat source that is
continuously moving away from the hot spots closer to the containment
vessel.
(2) Metal - water chemical reactions within the core.
(3) Melting of the core and shieldo
(4) Displacement of the core relative to the shield - containment
vessel due to core-shield melting. The displacement of the core,relative
to the lithium hydride inner shield was assumed to occur on a component
as opposed to a subcomponent basis, i»e., portions of the core region
could not displace due to local melting of the lithium hydride surround-
ing the core but rather all of the lithium hydride beneath the core was
required to be molten before core displacement occurred.
(5) Pressure build-up within the containment vessel due to vaporized
fission products, metal-water reactions, and cover gases.
(6) Creep rupture analysis of the containment vessel.
In addition, the core was treated as a homogenized entity which yields an
average as opposed to a peak core temperature prediction. This tends to
delay the time required for the core to displace the lithium hydride and
reach the innermost tungsten shield layer.
The ESATA computer code is being extended as part of an Air Force
contract F29601-M2-C00035 (ref, 11) to include analysis of liquid metal
fast reactor containment systems, dissociation of hydride materials that
could be considered as part of the system shield, and vaporization/
condensation of liquid metals.
Heat Transfer Model
A heat transfer nodal model of the reference system design is shown
in figure 5. This model contains 218 internal nodes. The following
basic modeling assumptions were made:
(1) Two-dimensional time-dependent analysis with line of symmetry
perpendicular to soil and coexistent with core centerline
(2) No internal deformation with shield layer structure intact
(3) Piping and structural support considered as part of the reactor
core from a heat capacitance standpoint
The reactor core and the inner shield region are divided into 38
cylindrical and interfacing nodes. Of the 38 nodes, those representing
the core are established as part of the input to the program. The re-
maining nodes are used to mathematically couple the cylindrical nodes
representing the core to the spherical nodes representing the remainder
of the reactor containment vessel system.
Nodes 39 to 170 represent the remainder of the reactor containment
system. It consists of four layers of tungsten shielding (nodes 39 to 50,
63 to 74, 87 to 98, and 111 to 122), a layer of U02 for insulation adja-
cent to the containment vessel (nodes 135 to 146) , and the containment
vessel (147 to 170). The remaining nodes represent LiH shielding.
Nodes 171 to 219 represent the environment. In some.cases these are
represented as soil conduction or they are air convection and radiation
nodes. They are designated internal to the program by the degree of
ground burial provided in.the input.
The initial system temperatures and pressures at the time of impact
for all the computations are summarized in table 3. Table 4 summarizes
the weight of those components forming the reactor core. Also, included
in table 4 is the surface areas of the fuel pin clad and of the pressure
tubes. The radii and shield layer thicknesses are presented in table 5.
All of this information is required as input to the ESATA code.
Parametric Calculations
The afterheat temperature response of the reference reactor contain-
ment vessel system described above was computed for 100, 200, and 300 mw
power levels and 33 and 50% earth burial. These computations assumed a
soft impact, i.e., the undeformed model„ Two modes of redistributing the
fission products were examined. In the first mode the computations as-
sumed upward movement of the fission products.resulting in preferential
deposition of the fission products on approximately 60% of the upward
surface area. The second mode assumed condensation on a volume-weighted
basis uniformly over an entire shield layer,, Table 6 summarizes the
cases that were calculated and specifies the mode of redistribution. All
computations were terminated after 1 600 000 seconds (445 hrs) following
the impact event.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The data presented in this report are an initial attempt to under-
stand the powerplant design variables that affect the post-impact survival
of the system. Therefore, the results presented herein are strongly de-
pendent on the assumptions that were part of the heat-transfer model and
presented in the previous section.
Time - Temperature Response of the Containment System
The afterheat time - temperature response of the reactor containment
vessel system was examined for a typical configuration using case 1 of
table 6. In case 1 it was assumed that the containment vessel penetrated
the soil to a depth of 50% of the diameter and the reactor was operating
at 300 mw of power prior to impact. It was also assumed that the fission
products - once released from the core - would rise upward and condense
and re-evaporate only from the upper portion (60% of the circumference of
any spherical shield layer) of the system.
Figure 6 presents representative:temperatures in the core, shield,
and containment vessel at various times after shutdown. At about 300
seconds, the core temperature response flattened due to the melting of
the 18 000 pounds of core structure. Approximately 400 seconds were re-
quired for the core structure to completely melt. Once melting was com-
pleted, the core continued to increase in temperature to a peak value of
4800° R which occurred at about 10 000 seconds. In the 10 000 to 100 000
second time period the core decreased in temperature to about 3000° R as
its heat was absorbed by the relatively cool lithium hydride surrounding
the core. The core remained at a relatively constant temperature for the
next 400 000 seconds as the lithium hydride surrounding the core melted
and was displaced by the core as shown in figure 7. At 500 000 seconds,
the core sank to the first tungsten shield layer. The core increased
slightly in temperature for subsequent time period due principally to the
removal of the lithium hydride sink (all lithium hydride in the core
region was molten) and because the core was moving into regions of lower
heat dissipation. The shield and containment vessel temperatures in-
creased more slowly because of the time it takes the heat to reach them.
8Time - Temperature Response of the Containment Vessel
Figure 8 compares the time - temperature response of the top and
bottom of the containment vessel for case 1. Its upper surface tempera-
ture peaked at 880 R at about 500 000 seconds. The bottom surface tem-
perature, although appearing to reach its peak, continues to increase to
1660° R at 1 600 000 seconds which was the termination point for all the
computations. Figure 9 presents the circumferential temperature profile
of the containment vessel at the 1 000 000 seconds time point in the
afterheat decay transient. The temperature profile at the top and bottom
is flat with a steep 800° F change in a 30 degree region between the two
levels. The smaller temperature level corresponds to the section of the
containment vessel that is adjacent to air and the larger temperature
level corresponds to the vessel section .adjacent to the soil. The steep
temperature change along the vessel at the soil to air interface indicates
that circumferential conduction in the containment vessel does not redis-
tribute the heat significantly.
Heat Generated Versus Heat Dissipated
The greater the ground burial the longer the time at which the heat
generated equals the heat dissipated. The amount of heat capacity of the
system and the thickness of insulation adjacent to the containment vessel
will also delay the time for a heat balance. The more rapid the fission
products transport outward, however, the faster the time for a heat
balance.
Figure 10 compares the total heat generated in the system to the
heat transferred from the portion of the containment vessel exposed to
the ambient air environment for case 1. The total heat generated is
different from that shown in figure 3 due to the added heats of the metal-
water reactions and changes of state of system materials. At 1 600 000
seconds the heat generated in,the system is about equal to the heat trans-
ferred to the air. At this time increment the heat absorbed by the system
components is essentially zero. The surface heat transferred is rela-
tively constant after about 100 000 seconds. This is because a portion
of the total heat generated is also being absorbed by the lithium hydride
in the system and is being dissipated to the soil.
The significance of this heat balance is that the highest internal
temperatures in the system peak at this point in time. The 1 600 000
second time period was chosen for the calculations so that the cases run
would be near or past their point of heat balance. In addition, this
long time to temperature peaking is important in that it could allow time
to find the vessel and to bring additional cooling to the impact site to
lower the containment vessel temperature.
Heat Dissipation
The internal heat generated by fission product decay is both ab-
sorbed by the system components and dissipated to the environment by con-
duction to the soil and radiated and convected to space. For case 3 at
the 1 000 000 second time step the heat generated just equals that dis-
sipated with the heat absorbed by the system components essentially zero
(as in case 1 at the 1 600 000 second time step). At this time step the
amount of heat that is conducted to the Earth is 8.7 kw (heat flux of
107o5 Btu/hr-ft2) while that dissipated to air is 297 kw (heat flux of
1023 Btu/hr-ft2). Of the heat that is dissipated to air 38 percent is by
natural convection and 62 percent by radiation. A typical surface temper-
ature of the exposed containment vessel was 859 R while that adjacent to
the Earth was 1535° R.
Containment Vessel Pressure Response
Figure 11 illustrates the variation in internal pressure with time.
The steep increase in internal pressure early in the transient is due to
the metal - water reaction followed by a release of hydrogen. Subsequent
increases in internal pressure result from vaporization at increased in-r
ternal temperatures. At the peak pressure of 1045 psi, the containment
vessel stress level is 20 905 psi. At the termination of the transient
(1 600 000 sec) only 5 percent of the containment vessel creep rupture
lifetime was consumed,
The final pressure of the containment system is also influenced by
the initial pressure the system had after impact. This pressure, however,
can be controlled by judicial design. Case 1 of this study used 30 psi
as the helium blanket pressure of the system at the start of the post-
impact period^ Shield materials used within the system design can also
influence the final system pressure and subsequently the containment
vessel stress level. Neither the volume change due to melting or the
effects of dissociation of LiH were taken into consideration. Due to the
large amounts of LiH, this could increase the system pressure as shield
temperatures, reach the level at which dissociation occurs.
Fission Product Redistribution
The mode of fission product redistribution influences the temperature
of the containment system. The two extremes in predicting how the fission
products would redistribute when the core begins to melt are: (1) all
fission products released from the core are uniformly distributed through-
out the containment system in a 4ir manner as in case 2; and (2) that all
fission products released from the core move upward and condense on the
surfaces that are exposed to the atmosphere with no fission products con-
densing on the surfaces exposed to the ground interface as in case 1. The
second process was used for the model for fission product redistribution
in most of the cases studied in this report as it was felt the molten
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material would tend to block the downward movement of the fission prod-
ucts. Case 2, however, was run to determine the effect of the two ex-
tremes in fission product redistribution modeling.
Figure 12 presents the surface temperature response of the top and
bottom of the containment vessel for cases 1 and 2» The surface tempera-
tures performed as expected. When the fission products plated uniformly,
the bottom surface temperature of the containment vessel were in excess
of 1800° R and still increasing at the 1 600 000 second calculation time
increment,, This was due to the heat sources that were deposited in that
area. When the fission products plated preferentially, i.e., in the
upper portion of the containment system, the bottom surface temperatures
ran cooler - less than 1700° R and peaking out. This was due to the
absence of fission product heat sources in that area.
For the top surface temperatures, when the preferential plating
occurred, more fission .products (heat sources) were deposited in this
area, thus the surface temperature was higher. When a uniform plating
occurred less fission products were in the area due to those that plated
in other areas of the system - thus the surface temperature was lower.
Influence of Reactor Operating Power Level and Degree of Burial
The influence of the reactor operating power level on the contain-
ment vessel temperature response is presented in figures 13 and 14 for >soil
penetration depths of 50 percent (cases 1, 4, and 6) and 33 percent
(cases 3, 5, and 7). The depth of burial had little influence on the
time for temperature peaking or on the peak temperature level for the
cases considered. For 100 to 300 mw power levels, the temperature of the
exposed (top) portion of the containment vessel peaked in the 100 000 to
the 1 000 000 second time period at a temperature less than 900° R. The
time that the peak temperature was reached increased with increasing
power levelo The temperatures of the buried portion of the containment
vessel reached about ,12,00° to 1700° R for powers of 100 to 300 mw and
tended to reach temperature plateaus during the transient. This is be-
cause the total heat generated by the system is being absorbed due to .
melting of the internal components, I0e., principally the lithium hydride
shield layers. The sudden increase in temperature at about 500 000 sec-
onds occurred because of the completion of melting of a large fraction of
the lithium hydride in the system.
Figure 15 presents the containment vessel temperature as a function
of power level at 1 600 000 seconds following impact. At the containment,
vessel bottom, a 50 percent Earth burial as opposed to a 33 percent Earth
burial resulted: in about a 140° F containment vessel temperature differ-
ence at a 100 mw reactor power level and about 60° F for the 300 mw power
level, Also, lowering the reactor power level from 300 to 100 mw results
in a 400° F decrease in the temperature for the buried portion of the con-
tainment vessel.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Small nuclear powerplants used as the power supply for mobile ve-
hicles are subject to high speed impact accidents. In the event that
this accident occurs the afterheat of the decay of fission products must
be removed to prevent the melting of the containment vessel and the re-
lease of fission products. With the loss of the coolant system due to
the impact accident the heat must be transferred through the containment
vessel and into the surrounding environment„
A computer program entitled "Executive Subroutines for Afterheat
Temperature Analysis" (ESATA) was used to analyze the time - temperature
response during the post-impact period of a system designed to deliver up
to 300 mw of thermal power to a nuclear airplane. This analysis considers
in addition to conduction, radiation, and convection, the heats of fusion,
vaporization, and material movement due to the melting and resolidifica-
tion of the core. Also, the process of the fission products' vaporizing
and convecting upward to condense on cooler surfaces is considered.
Seven cases were computed and their data presented. The results are
summarized as follows:
1. The temperature response of the containment system is noticeably
affected by the melting of the core and the heat absorption of the shield
material.
2. When the fission products plated preferentially, i.e., in the
upper portion of the containment system the bottom surface temperatures
ran cooler - less than 1700° R and were peaking out.
3. When the fission products plated uniformly the bottom surface tem-
peratures of the containment vessel were in excess of 1800° R thus, con-
vection is an important transport mechanism limiting the peak tempera-
tures .
4. Lowering the reactor power level from 300 to 100 mw results in a
F decre
ment vessel.
400° ase in the temperature for the buried portion of the contain-
So The time required to reach the peak containment vessel temperature
following the impact event could potentially be in excess of 1 600 000
seconds (445 hrs).
6. Increasing the degree of soil burial from 33 to 50 percent of the
containment vessel diameter increases the vessel temperature by about
100° F at a 100 mw power level and by about 60° F at 300 mw but does not
change the time to peak temperature, significantly.
7. The maximum peak containment vessel temperature calculated was
1660° F and occurred for the 300 mw, 50 percent burial, 60 percent fission
product redistribution case0 This temperature is within the material
limits for 304 stainless steel.
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8. For a typical case at the 1 000 000 second time increment,
38 percent of the heat was dissipated by natural convection, 62 percent
by radiation, and less than 2 percent conducted to the Earth.
REFERENCES
1. F. E. ROM, "Airbreathing Nuclear Propulsion - A New Look," NASA TM
X-2425 (1971).
2. P. M. FINNEGAN, R. L. PUTHOFF, and Jo W. TURNBOW, "Preliminary
Impact Speed and Angle Criteria for Design of a Nuclear Airplane
Fission Product Containment Vessel," NASA TM X-2245 (1971).
3. R. L. PUTHOFF and T. DALLAS, "Preliminary Results on 400 ft/sec
Impact Tests of Two 2-Foot Diameter Containment Models for Mobile
Nuclear Reactors," NASA TM X-52915 (1970).
4. R. L. PUTHOFF, "High Speed Impact Tests of a Model Nuclear Reactor
Containment System," NASA TM X-67856 (1971).
5. R. L< PUTHOFF, "A 640 ft/sec Impact Test of a Two-Foot Diameter
Model Nuclear Reactor Containment System Without Fracture," NASA
TM X-67997 (1972).
6. R. L. PUTHOFF, "A 1055 ft/see Impact Test of a Two-Foot Diameter
Model Nuclear Reactor Containment System Without Fracture," to be
published.
7. C. W. YOUNG, "The Development of Empirical Equations for Predicting
Depth of an Earth-Penetrating Projectile," SC-DR-67-60, Sandia
Laboratories (May 1967).
8. W. G. PARKER, L, E. VAN BIBBER, and Y. S. TANG, "After Heat Distri-
bution of a Mobile Nuclear Power Plant," WANLPR(WWW)-11, NASA
CR-120825, Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Nov. 1971).
9. W. G. PARKER, and L. E. VAN BIBBER, "Operations Manual for the ESATA
Computer Program," NASA CR-120826, Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Nov.
1971).
10. Bo Lo PIERCE and H. J. STUMPF, "TAP-A Program for Computing Transients
or Steady-State Temperature Distribution," WANL-TME-1872, Westing-
house Electric Corp. (Dec. 1969).
11. Contract F29601-72-C-0035, Reactor Safety Study for Nuclear Powered
.Aircraft, being performed by Westinghouse for Air Force Special
Weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.
13
TABLE 1. - REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS
Reactor power, MW ' 100 to 300
Reactor inlet pressure, psi 1500
Reactor inlet temperature, F 1000
Operating lifetime, hr 10 000
Active reactor core, diam in. 66
Active reactor core, length in. 42
Reactor shut down pressure, psi 30
TABLE 2. - MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION
Fuel element clad Molybdenum Alloy TZM
Fuel element supports Hastelloy X
Pressure tube layers Hastelloy X, Min-K 2000
and Austenitic Steel
(AM-355)
Pressure vessel. Austenitic Steel (AM-355)
Shielding Tungsten, LiH
Containment vessel Stainless Steel (316)
Insulation IK^
Moderator Water (all but 300 Ib
removed prior to impact)
TABLE 3. - INITIAL TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES
Temperature,
°R
Clad and fuel 2310
Structure 1660
Water 672
Shield 1260
Containment vessel 560
Ambient 560
Internal pressure 30 psi
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TABLE 4. - CORE MASS AND AREA
Mass,
lb
Molybdenum 8 130
U02 in core 1 914
Pressure vessel and support structure 17 939
Water left in core. 300
Area,
in. 2
Pressure tube surface area 113 000
Clad area 303 000
TABLE 5. - KEY RADII AND THICKNESSES
Overall core radius, in. 35
Overall core height, in. 53
Inner Thickness,
. . . radius, in.
in.
Shield layers
First layer 54 2.5
Second layer 60 1.5
Third layer 70 1.0
Fourth layer 85 1.0
IK>2 insulation thickness, in. 4.0
Containment vessel inner radius, in. 120
Containment vessel thickness, in. 3
is
TABLE 6. - SUMMARY OF PARAMETRIC CALCULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter
Power level, MW
Degree of burial, %
Fission product re-
distribution, %
1
300
50
60
2
300
50
100
3
300
33
60
Case
4
200
50
60
5
200
33
60
6
100
50
60
7
100
33
60
Figure l(a). - Nuclear containment system - before impact.
C-71-4042
Figure Kb). - Nuclear containment system - after impact.
Figure 2(a). - Concrete target - before impact.
Figure 2(b). - Concrete target - after impact.
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Figure, 5. - Heat transfer nodal model.
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